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The purpose of this study is to examine whether insiders can earn abnormal returns by 
their trades in the Finnish stock market. Insider trading has been researched for decades 
and the first studies are from the late 1960s. Insider trading can be considered as one the 
most profitable anomalies. Insiders’ reasons to trade their own companies’ stocks might 
be liquidity needs or they may want to benefit from undervalued market prices. However, 
insiders might have non-public information and thus be better informed of the company’s 
situation and prospects than other investors.  
 
The theoretical framework contains a review of the previous studies and regulation of 
insider trading. Also, the difference between legal and illegal insider trading is presented. 
Insider trading’s profitability is an evidence against efficient markets theory. Therefore, 
the theory is presented in theoretical part. The empirical part consists of the data and 
methodology which is used in this study. The data which is used in the study contains 
insiders’ transactions in Helsinki OMX from July 2016 to July 2019. This thesis deploys 
the event study methodology. Abnormal returns are calculated separately for purchases 
and disposals. Also, the data is further divided into smaller groups based on the firm size 
and the type of the insider. 
 
The results of this study show that the insiders earned abnormal returns due to their trades. 
After insiders’ purchases, stock prices increased abnormally 1,68% (t-statistics 5,65) in 
30 days. The impact was the opposite after insiders’ disposals. Stock prices decreased 
abnormally -2,00% (t-statistics -4,41) in 30 days. The impact on stock returns was higher 
when insiders from small cap companies purchased or sold their stocks. The type of the 
insider has also an impact on the stock prices. Overall, insiders earned abnormal returns 
from July 2016 to July 2019 in the Finnish stock market and the results are mostly the 
same as in the previous international studies. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 












Insiders trade their company’s stocks for many different reasons. The natural reason for 
a disposal can be diversification or liquidity needs. Insiders might also purchase their own 
company’s stocks if they assume the stock is undervalued. However, insiders can trade 
stocks when they have information edge against other investors.  
 
Insider trading can be divided into two parts: legal insider trading and illegal insider trad-
ing. Illegal insider trading occurs when a person uses non-public information of the secu-
rity for trading. Illegal acts are not only trading the stocks based on non-public infor-
mation but also tipping such information. The more usual form of insider trading is legal 
insider trading which occurs when the insider of the company buys or sells the stock in 
his or her own company. Insider trading in this from is legal if it follows the regulation 
of insider trading. 
 
Insiders have information that is not publicly available, so it is important to study insider 
trades. Insiders are better informed about the situation of the company and outsiders 
should benefit when following what the insiders do. Derived from the efficient market 
hypothesis, insider trades should not have an impact on stock returns, as in the strong 
form of the efficient market hypothesis it is assumed that all information is available to 
everyone. 
 
Insider trading is one of the most researched anomalies. The first researchers are from the 
late 1960s when Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) found that insiders outperform the market. 
Even though insider trading has been researched internationally a lot, in Finland there are 
not many studies on insider trading. This is one of the main motivators to conduct the 
study in the Finnish markets.  
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1.2. Purpose of the study 
 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the impact of insider trades on stock returns. The 
approach is to examine whether an insider can earn abnormal returns by their trades and 
whether an investor earn abnormal returns by following insider trades in the NASDAQ 
OMX Helsinki. The purpose of the study is also to test efficient market hypothesis in the 
Helsinki stock exchange.  
 
This thesis also examines whether the impact of insider trades is different when the cor-
porate is large cap, mid cap or small cap. Lakonishok & Inmoo (2001) found in their 
research that insiders’ trades’ impact on stock returns were not significant except when it 
comes to purchasing small cap companies’ stocks. Furthermore, the type of insider may 
have impact on stock returns. Tavakoli, Manouchehr, McMillan & McKnight (2012) find 
in their paper that the type of the insider matters.  
 
 
1.3. Hypotheses and expected results 
 
 
The null hypothesis is that insider trades do not have impact on stock returns. An insider 
or an investor does not earn abnormal returns after an insider trade. The alternative hy-
pothesis is that the insider trade has an impact on stock returns. The insider or the investor 
does earn abnormal returns after insider’s purchase, and after insider’s sale the abnormal 
return is below zero. 
 
Many authors that have examined the impact of insider trades have found that insider 
trading has an impact on stock returns. For example, Foley, Kwan, McInish and Philip 
(2016) found the difference between discretionary and non-discretionary transactions by 
insiders. Insiders earned abnormal returns by their trades when the nature of the transac-
tion was discretionary. Also, Tavakoli, McMillan and McKnight (2011) found that insid-
ers have predictive power for the future returns. In this study, the expected results in the 
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Finnish market are similar to in previous studies. I assume that insiders’ trades have im-
pact on stock returns. 
 
 
1.4.Structure of the study 
 
The structure of the study is two-partial. The first part contains the theoretical matters and 
the second part consist of empirical part.  
 
In the first section previous literature of insider trading is presented. The literature review 
contains various previous studies from those which have been published in the 1970’s to 
newer studies. The studies are mainly executed in the markets of the United States. The 
reason for not presenting more studies from the Finnish market is that there are not many 
published papers that examine insider trading in the Finnish markets. The second section 
comprises the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which was introduced in the 1970 by 
Eugene F. Fama. In this section, the criticism of the efficient market hypothesis is evalu-
ated as well. The next section contains regulation of insider trading in Finland but also in 
the United States.  
 
The second part consists of the empirical part. The empirical part starts with introducing 
the data and the methodology which are used in this study. It consists of the introduction 
of the data and calculations which are used in this study. In chapter 6, the result of the 
empirical part is presented. First the descriptive data is shown. It contains the number of 
trades made by insiders from each company but also how the number varies between the 
type of the insider. The next chapter of it presents the conclusions of the empirical part. 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Insider trading and market efficiency have been researched a lot in different aspects. 
Many studies show that insiders can use privileged information to earn abnormal returns. 
Some of the studies are presented in this chapter. It can be stated that insiders are the most 
informed of the situation of their own company. They are not only aware of the upcoming 
developments, but they have the expertise to evaluate the effects of non-public infor-
mation to their company’s results and therefore the impact on stock returns. It is not a 
surprise that insider trading has been one of the most profitable anomalies in the past 
decades. The anomaly has existed for a long period of time. Even in the late 1960s, Lorie 
and Niederhoffer (1968) found that insiders outperform the market. The efficient market 
hypotheses were introduced around the same time with this finding. 
 
Jaffe (1974) introduced the zero-investment portfolio based on insider trades. The strat-
egy was to create a zero-investment portfolio which is long in companies with net pur-
chases and short in companies in which an insider has net sales in a given month. He did 
not find any abnormal returns for the zero investment portfolio and even when he included 
only transactions which were at least 20,000 dollars, he found no abnormal returns. After 
narrowing the conditions down, Jaffe found that insiders earned abnormal returns. The 
criteria for the long portfolio were that there had to be at least 3 insider buyers in a specific 
company and at least 3 sellers for the short portfolio. With the presented zero-investment 
portfolio, Jaffe found that insiders earned abnormal returns of 5,07% in the first 8 months 
after trade. 
 
Lakonishok, Josef & Inmoo Lee (2001) examine insider trades in the United States dur-
ing1975-1995. They found that there were not significant stock price movements when 
an insider reported their trades to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. 
However, they found stronger influence of insider trading in small cap stocks. Insider 
purchases were useful in informative aspect. The authors argue that the reason for it is 
that insiders might have plenty of reasons to sell but the main reason to buy is to make 
money. At last, the authors’ conclusion is that developing an investment strategy based 
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on insider trading is complex because insider trading has not significant impact on large 
stocks and trading in small stocks is expensive.  
 
Gangopadhuay, Yook, Ken & Sarwar & Ghulam (2009) examined insider trades’ profit-
ability in volatile markets. The authors chose a period of 2000-2003 as a proxy of volatile 
markets time. Based on that insiders are known to be contrarian traders; the authors hy-
pothesize that insiders earn abnormal returns from contrarian trading and trading which 
is based on insider information. They argue that if the stock multiples such as price-to-
earnings ratio is high and book-to-market ratio is low, the insiders should net sell the 
stocks. If insiders have non-public information which is not reflected in the stock price, 
they could net purchase even though the ratios presented earlier indicate that the stock 
price is overvalued.  
 
Gangopadhyay et al (2009) found that insiders use unpublished information and earn ab-
normal return in volatile markets. The effect still holds, even they adjusted for contrarian 
trading. They report that purchases made by insiders earned 22,5 % higher returns during 
a year than stocks which insiders had sold. After adding contrarian trading, the spread 
between purchases and disposals declines to 13,9 %. The results show that insiders trade 
in contrarian manners but also use unpublished useful information to support their deci-
sions. 
 
Tavakoli et al. (2012) find evidence that insider trading has an impact on stock returns in 
the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets. Their data covers 87 calendar months from 
January 2000 to March 2007. The period is particularly suitable because in 2000-2007 
there was not only recessionary but also growth period in the economy. Although they 
find evidence that insider trades have predictive power for returns, it is related to the 
status of the insider.  
 
In their regression analysis, Tavakoli et al. (2012) use different ratios to measure the de-
gree of insider transactions. In their first regression analysis, which does not include any 
other explanatory variables except the type of the insider, it is shown that the transactions 
of directors and officers have predictive power for the stock’s future returns. However, 
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the transactions of large shareholders and the group other do not have any predictive 
power. The authors also run their regression with several explanatory variables, such as 
the dividend yield, the price-earnings ratio, the price-to-book ratio, betas, the equity-to-
debt ratio and the movement of short-term interest rates. After controlling their results 
with alternative variables, they find that the results support first results, and the insider 
trades of directors and officers have predictive power for future returns. The results of the 
second regression show that now also the group other, which includes for example law-
yers, have predictive power for future returns. Still, group other has statistically insignif-
icant impact on future returns in the first regression. Tavakoli et al (2012) also divide the 
sample according to the firm size to groups small cap, medium cap, and large cap. They 
use the same explanatory variables than in the other regression. They find that the predic-
tive power of the directors’ trades is the most powerful in medium firms. Concerning 
small and large firms, the number of directors’ transactions has no impact on future re-
turns – however, the number of shares traded, and the value of the transaction has predic-
tive power. The results show that the number of directors’ trades matters. Officers’ trades 
have statistically significant impact only on small firms’ future returns. The results of the 
regression indicate that large shareholders’ trading has no impact on future returns.  
 
Foley, Kwan, McInich & Philip (2016) classified over 60 000 director transactions in the 
Australian markets. They sorted the directors’ transactions into discretion trades and non-
discretion trades. Foley et al (2016) hypothesis was that trades which are discretions are 
more informed than non-discretions trades and are more profitable. Authors used the mar-
ket model to calculate abnormal returns. They calculated the normal returns 200 days 
before the directors’ transactions. They decided to use the 200-day event window while 
the data they used was from January 2005 to December 2014. However, they use other 
event windows for robustness their results.  
 
Foley et al (2016) found that discretionary trades by insiders of the company were more 
profitable than non-discretionary trades. The figure 1 shows how discretionary purchases 
cumulative abnormal returns are much higher than non-discretionary purchases. Insiders 
earned an average cumulative abnormal return of 4,6% by their purchases. The results are 
the opposite when the nature of the purchase is non-discretionary. Cumulative abnormal 
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return was -5% for non-discretionary purchases. The figure 1 shows that the difference 
between discretionary sales and non-discretionary sales is remarkable. The cumulative 
abnormal return for discretionary sales was -15% while it was only -3% for non-discre-





Figure 1.  Profitability of insider’s discretionary and non-discretionary trades (Foley et 
al 2016). 
 
Foley et al (2016) used different event windows and found that abnormal holds for dis-
cretionary transactions. Discretionary transactions outperformed non-discretionary trans-
actions whether the event window was short or long.  
 
In Finland, there are not that many studies regarding insider trading. Kasanen (1999) ex-
amines insider trades in different aspects. The purpose of his study was to examine the 
17 
 
shares owned by insiders and whether an insider can earn abnormal return in the Helsinki 
stock exchange. The research was conducted in 1999 and the data is from 1.8.1996 to 17 
months forward. Insiders held only 2 % of HEX stocks on average and only 1 % of the 
trading volume was caused by insiders. Kasanen (1999: 77) used three different event 
periods: 5, 15- and 30-days event windows. The relatively short event windows are due 
to the short data. Kasanen (1999: 77-81) used different methodologies to model abnormal 
returns. He used for example average adjusted return model, market model in dummy 
regression and market model residual analysis.   
 
The results show that insiders did not earn abnormal returns during this period. Kasanen 
(1999: 82-88) did not find causality between insider trades and abnormal returns. He 
states that modelling abnormal returns has some econometrical difficulties. Therefore, he 
used different methodologies to model abnormal returns. The results were quite identical 
with different methodologies.  
 
As a conclusion it can be said that insiders have earned abnormal returns according the 
previous studies. Previous studies have different aspects but mainly the results show that 
insiders can time their transactions better than markets on average. The research paper of 
Kasanen (1999) was the only study in which the results show that insiders did not earn 
abnormal returns. The above-mentioned paper is the only work which was executed in 
the Finnish market. The data which is used in this study was in 1996-1997. To examine 






3. EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
The ideal situation is that security prices would fully reflect all available information at 
any time. A market which reflects all available information is called efficient market. The 
inventor of the efficient market hypothesis is Eugene F. Fama who introduced the effi-
cient market hypothesis in 1970. (Fama 1970) 
 
Market efficiency is divided into three information subsets which are the weak form, the 
semi-strong form, and the strong form. These three forms are based on how the infor-
mation reflects on the price of a security: (i) in the weak form, prices reflect only infor-
mation of past stock’s prices. In this form prices follow a random walk. (ii) At the second 
level of market efficiency, prices fulfil the weak form but also other publicly available 
information. If markets are semi-strong efficient, the stock price should reflect immedi-
ately to public information like different announcements such as quarter earnings. (iii) 
third level is the strong form in which the stock prices should reflect all information. In 
this circumstance no one can beat the market and earn abnormal return. In the strong 
form, no one has information that another one does not have.  
 
The efficient market hypothesis has three assumptions. The first of the assumptions is that 
an investor behaves rationally in the market. It means that investors would value securities 
to their fundamental value. The price reflection happens immediately when new infor-
mation of the security appears to the market. The second assumption is that investors’ 
activities are not correlated. If their activities in the market are uncorrelated it leads to a 
scenario where their trades cancel each other without affecting the price. If this assump-
tion holds, it is not harmless to market efficiency if part of the investors would be irra-
tionals. The last assumption is related to the second assumptions. If the investor’s activi-
ties would be correlated and irrational activities takes place, then the arbitragers eliminate 
their trades. (Yalcin 2010.) 
 
Market efficiency theory assumes that the market is rational, and the prices of securities 
reflect their fundamental values. If the market is rational, then there are no mispricing of 
securities and thus there are no anomalies. However, this theory has been challenged and 
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the market knows a lot of different anomalies, for example cash dividends anomaly and 
insider trading. One of the reasons for anomalies to appear are irrational activities and the 
arbitrage opportunities being limited in the market. (Yalcin 2010.) 
 
 
3.1 Insider trading anomaly 
 
 
Insider trading can be considered as one the of most profitable anomalies. It has been 
researched for decades in many different markets and it has generated abnormal returns. 
Supporters of the efficient market theory argue that anomalies can be found because of 
data mining or as a result of risky trades. It is hard to argue that anomaly of insider trading 
would not exists while it has been researched for decades in different time periods cover-
ing different nonoverlapping periods. (Zacks 2011: 151-152.) For example, Zacks (2011: 
151-152) used a large data period of 1978-2005 to research the profitability of insider 
trades in their book called “The handbook of equity market anomalies: Translating market 
inefficiencies into effective investment strategies”. Table 1 shows how insider’s pur-
chases generated 0,35% monthly excess returns against S&P 500. 
 
 






Even though the table 1 shows that insider trade strategy generated abnormal returns on 
average, the result varies from year to year. In the period of 28 years, the insider trade 
strategy beat the S&P 500 sixteen times and the S&P 500 outperformed the insider trade 
strategy twelve times. 
 
Zacks (2011: 154) calculated how abnormal returns are generated in a longer holding 




Figure 2. Cumulative excess returns (Zacks 2011:154). 
 
The figure 2 shows that the most intensive growing happens within the first month. This 
indicates the positive reaction of the market after insider’s trade after two months from 
the insider’s trade, over half of the annual cumulative excess returns has been generated. 
However, approximately 170 days after the insider trade, the cumulative excess returns 
curve starts to increase. According Zacks (2011), this can indicate that the insiders pur-
chased their company’s stocks from 6 to 9 months in advance before the favourable 
events. 
 
Zacks (2011: 155) also presented a figure how abnormal returns are generated in a shorter 
period. The figure 3 shows a 10-day event window after the insider trade. After day 0 
through day 5 most of the abnormal returns are earned in this period. Immediately after 
the purchase, the insider has earned over 0,8 % abnormal returns. Daily abnormal returns 
21 
 
occur between 0,2% to 0,4 % from day 1 through 4 and after 5 day through 10 day, daily 
excess returns are close to zero.  
 
 
Figure 3. Daily excess returns (Zacks 2011: 155). 
 
3.1.1. Returns between small cap and large cap  
 
As we know, an insider has an information edge against the market. When the information 
asymmetry is larger, insiders should theoretically generate higher abnormal returns. In-
siders in small cap companies might have a higher information edge because there are 
usually a smaller number of analysts that are following the companies than large cap 
companies. According Zacks (2011: 155-156) analysis, insiders earned 50 basis points by 
their purchases per month more than insiders in large cap companies. While insiders in 
large cap companies earned monthly 0,41% more than the S&P 500, insiders in small cap 
companies earned 0,91% more per month than the S&P 500.  
 
3.1.2. Insiders’ sales 
 
Insiders might have many reasons to sell their stocks. Their motivation to sell their stocks 
might be liquidity needs or diversification. However, insiders might have non-public in-
formation which motivates them to sell their stocks. These reasons could be the declining 
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earnings of the company in the future or even the possible bankruptcy. Zacks (2011: 159-
160.) 
 
Zacks (2011: 159-160) used the period of 1978-2005 and did a short sale portfolio. They 
used a lot of rules when conducting the portfolio: there must be at least three insiders 
selling during the prior 3-month period, they eliminated small sell transactions and there 
must be at least 25,000 shares sold in the 3-month period. They also included only large 
cap companies because of the difficulties to short sell small size companies’ stocks. Also, 
insiders’ purchases were not allowed in the 3-month periods. They did a portfolio under 
these rules and held the positions for a year. The sales portfolio underperformed the S&P 
500 but still the average return was positive. The sales portfolio has average returns of 




Figure 4. Insider trading sales portfolio return (Zacks 2011: 159). 
 
 
As we can see in Figure 4, the period from 1978 to 1997 was a long bull market period 
so this explains that short strategy has positive returns as well. From 1998 to 2005 sales 
strategy had negative returns while the S&P 500 had positive returns.  
 
As a conclusion it can be stated that the insider anomaly exists, and evidence of insider 
trading profitability has been found from 1970 to century of 2010. This section presented 
insider trading as an anomaly and focused only to one research paper. However, similar 
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results which Zacks (2011) presented, have been found in other studies which have been 
presented earlier in section 2 of this study.  
 
As most of the abnormal returns are generated in a couple of days after the insider trade 








In this section the regulation of insider trading is presented. Since the data of this study 
is about Finnish companies, the regulation of Finland is observed more closely. How-
ever, the regulation of United States is represented for comparison purposes. The sec-
tion also includes the definition of illegal insider trading. 
 
4.1. Regulation in Finland 
 
 
In Finland, listed companies have the obligation of disclosure of periodic information. 
This information is for example financial statements or annual reports. Along with peri-
odic information, companies have an ongoing disclosure obligation of which purpose is 
to make sure that all investors have an equal and concurrent access to information. The 
main purpose of ongoing disclosure obligation is that companies release the insider infor-
mation. Insider information must be published as soon as possible. (Finanssivalvonta 
2017.)  
 
Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), which is a regulation from the European Union, obli-
gates executives and their inner circle of issuer to report transactions related to the shares 
or debt instruments of that issuer. MAR is a directly applicable regulation, and it replaced 
the previous Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC on 3 July 2016. Obligation to declare 
transactions concern all transactions when the amount of 5 000 euros is reached in a cal-
endar year. The transactions must be reported within 3 working days from the day the 
transaction has been executed. The issuer must deliver the information of duties by Mar-
ket Abuse Regulation article 19 to persons who works in managerial capacity. (Finans-
sivalvonta 2018) 
 
Market Abuse Regulation also includes regulation of prevention and detection of market 
abuse. Under Article 16 of MAR market operators and investments companies which are 
operating in trading markets must put into operation effective arrangements, systems, and 
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procedures to prevent and discern insider trades, market manipulation and attempts of 
insider trade or market manipulation. (Finanssivalvonta 2018b.) 
 
 
4.1.1. Who are the insiders? 
 
Obligation to declare the transactions concerns executives and their inner circle. The def-
inition of the person who is included in the executives is defined in Market Abuse Regu-
lation 3.1 article 25. The definition is following: 
 
1. The member of administration, executive or monitoring. 
2. The person from upper level, which is not including to group 1, but have regular 
access to insider information and who have a mandate to make decisions which 
belong to administration and these decisions have an impact on community’s de-
velopment and future business activities.  
 
The obligation to declare the transactions also concern an inner circle of executives. The 
definition of persons who belong to inner circle of executives is defined in Market Abuse 
Regulation 3.1 article 26 and is following: 
 
1. The spouse or an analogous spouse according to a national legislation.  
2. A dependant child. 
3. A relative, which has lived at least a year in the same household within a time of 
transaction’s execute time.  
4. Juristic person or a partnership. 
 
There are periods when trading is forbidden for insiders and the limits are set by Market 
Abuse Regulation. Trading is forbidden for insiders, which are identified in section 4.1, 





4.2. Regulation in the United States 
 
Insider Trading was regulated at Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It has been amended 
later and the latest amend is from 2019. Prohibition Act H.R. 2534 is the Act which con-
tains the definition of illegal trading. The Act consist of guidelines for what is considered 
as non-public information. Part SEC. 16A (a) includes information of prohibition on trad-
ing securities when having non-public information. It states that: 
 “ It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell, or enter 
into, or cause the purchase or sale of or entry into, any security, security-based swap, or 
security-based swap agreement, while aware of material, non-public information relating 
to such security, security-based swap, or security-based swap agreement, or any non-
public information, from whatever source, that has, or would reasonably be expected to 
have, a material effect on the market price of any such security, security-based swap, or 
security-based swap agreement, if such person knows, or recklessly disregards, that such 
information has been obtained wrongfully, or that such purchase or sale would constitute 
a wrongful use of such information”. 
The second part consist of prohibition against the wrongful communication of certain 
material which is non-public. It states that: 
 “It shall be unlawful for any person whose own purchase or sale of a security, security-
based swap, or entry into a security-based swap agreement would violate subsection (a), 
wrongfully to communicate material, non-public information relating to such security, 
security-based swap, or security-based swap agreement, or any non-public information, 
from whatever source, that has, or would reasonably be expected to have, a material 
effect on the market price of any such security, security-based swap, or security-based 
swap agreement, to any other person if (1) the other person:  
(a) purchases, sells, or causes the purchase or sale of, any security or security-based 
swap or enters or causes the entry into any security-based swap agreement, to which such 
communication relates; or 
(b) communicates the information to another person who makes or causes such a pur-
chase, sale, or entry while aware of such information; and 
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“2) such a purchase, sale, or entry while aware of such information is reasonably fore-
seeable.” (Congress.gov 2019.) 
 
 
4.3. Illegal insider trading 
 
 
In this section illegal insider trading is introduced more practically. Illegal insider trade 
occurs when a person uses non-public information about the security for trading. Illegal 
acts are not only trading the stocks based on non-public information but also tipping such 






Figure 5. Insider trading impact on stock prices (Boatright 2010: 202) 
 
 
Figure 5 shows how illegal insider trade might happens. Time t = 0 is the moment when 
a price-sensitive event occurs. Time t= 1 is the moment when the announcement is pub-
lished. In panel c is defined a fundamental value of the company. After a price-sensitive 
event happens the fundamental value increases at time t = 0 and stays flat after the an-
nouncement publishment at time t = 1. Panel a. represent how stock price reacts to event 
and announcement when illegal insider trading does not occur. A price-sensitive event 
occurs at time t = 0 but stock price does not react to the event until it is published at 
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time t = 1. After the public announcement, the stock price increases to the same level as 
the fundamental value. In panel b., insider trading is involved. After the price-sensitive 
event occurs the stock price starts to increase. The reaction happens before the an-
nouncement is public. There are two different outcomes how the stock price reflects the 
fundamental value of the company. If insider trading is allowed the impact would be 
immediate after the event occurs. The second outcome is more realistic and reflects 
more how illegal insider trading happens. After time t = 0 stock price starts to increase 
but more steadily than in the first example. It reaches the fundamental value at time t = 





5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
In this chapter the data and the methodology of this study are presented. The data section 
includes detailed information of the data which is used in this study. In this section the 
period which is used in this study is presented but also which transactions are included to 
the data and which are excluded from the data. The methodology part consists of the 
methods which are used in this study. After the methodology is presented the possible 




The data of insider trades is available in NASDAQ’s webpage. It contains 5530 insider 
trades during 1.7.2016-1.7.2019. However, the data contains also share-based incentives 
which are excluded from data. Also, those transactions which comprise under 100 shares 
are excluded from the data. The clean data without share-based incentives and under 100 
shares transactions contains of 1849 insider trades. The original exported data did not 
include all the information of the trades, such as the number of the traded shares, whether 
the transaction is a purchase or a disposal, nor the status of the insider. However, the size 
of the trade and the status of the insider can be found in NASDAQ’s webpage, but the 
information must be imported manually. 
 
The companies which are listed in OMX Helsinki during the selected period are excluded 
from the data. In 2016 there were 6 listings and in 2017 the number of the new listings 
were 7. Also, the companies which have left from OMX Helsinki are excluded from the 
data. Therefore, the number of companies which are used in this study is 117. Historical 
stock prices are collected from Yahoo finance and the data also contains the benchmark 
which is the OMX Helsinki PI.  
 
The data is be cut into the different fractions. Insiders are classified to the three groups 
based on their status: 1) a member of the administration, management, or supervising 
body of the entity 2) a senior executive who has a regular access to inside information 3) 
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Chief Executive Officers. The data is also divided into sections based on the size of the 
company. The companies are divided into three groups: small-cap, mid-cap, and large-
cap. In this study the same distribution is used than how Nasdaq divides the companies. 
(Nasdaq 2020). 
 
5.1.1. Benchmark index 
 
The benchmark index which is used in this study is the OMX Helsinki PI (OMXHPI). 
The index is adjusted for dividends and splits. The index contains the companies which 
are listed in the main list. The benchmark index presents the market return and is used 





Figure 6. OMX Helsinki Price Index during 1.7.2016-1.7.2019. 
 
 
Figure 6 shows OMX Helsinki Index price development in period 1.7.2016-1.7.2019. The 
curve of the OMXHPI price was upward in this period and the price increased 17,5% in 














The event study is the methodology which is be used in this study. When examining the 
security price movements around a specific event, the event study methodology is the 
common approach (Binder 1998). Event study begins with a definition of the event. The 
event might be for example a change of chief executive officer or a publication of a re-
markable trade from the company. The nature of the event defines the event window that 
should be use. Some events’ reactions for stock prices happen immediately and for some 
events’ the impacts happen in longer intervals for stock prices. For example, mergers or 
profit warnings are the kind of events in which the impact appears usually fast on the 
stock price. In these kinds of events the event window should be short. The nature of the 
event might be also that it is not immediately reflected on the stock price. One of this kind 
of events is insider trades. When examining the abnormal returns after insider trades, the 
event window should be longer because the impact on stock price is not immediate. These 
kind of event studies are more problematic because when the event window lengthens 
there might be more factors which could have impact on returns. (Kasanen 1999: 60-61.) 
 
The event study can be divided in different time sections. The event notation is T. For the 
period before the event it is T-1 and for the period after the event it is T+1. 
 
 
5.2.1.  Estimation window 
 
After the event is known the estimation window is the period before the specific event, 
and it is common that the estimation window is not overlapping with the event window 
(MacKinlay 1977). Estimation window is the period where the normal return of the stock 
is calculated.  
 
The decided estimation window in this study is 195 days. It has been set to start 200 days 
before the event (T-200) and ends 5 days before the event (T-5). Estimation window T-1 




5.2.2. Event window 
 
The event window is the period around the specific event. The event window is the time 
when we assume that the specific event has an effect to the stock returns (Kasanen 1999: 
60-61). In other studies where the event study is used as the methodology the event win-
dow is usually T-1; T+1. The reason for using the event window so that it begins before 
the event is that the information might be leaked before the specific event occurs. When 
examining the effect of insider trades on returns the possible impact is assumed to be after 
the event in this study.  
 
Three different event windows are used in this study: 5 days, 10 days, and 30 days. The 
reason for relatively short event windows is that the reliability of the event study could 
decrease because other factors may have an effect for possible abnormal returns of the 
stock. (Kasanen 1999: 60-61) 
 
5.2.3.  Normal returns 
 
There are several ways to execute an event study, but the most common way is to measure 
securities mean and cumulative mean abnormal return around the period of an event. In 
this study the approach is similar to Fama, Fisher, Jensen And Roll (1969) where they 
examine the stock split announcements’ impact on stock returns, but daily stock returns 
are used in this study instead of monthly returns. The first step is to control normal returns 
which are calculated with the market model: 
 
(1)           𝑅𝑖𝑡= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡 
 
Where dependent variable 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is normal return in day t to stock i. As the control variable 
in this model is stock market index 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡. The residual µ𝑖𝑡 is an estimator of the abnormal 
return. A residual µ𝑖𝑡 is the part of the return which market return cannot explain.  
 




To calculate abnormal returns the following equation is used: 
 
(2)          𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡= 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼−𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡  
 
Rit = the return on security i on time t 
𝛼i = a regression constant OLS-estimator, which assumed to be constant over the time. 
𝛽i = covariance between the stock return and the market return. Assumed to be constant 
over the time. 
Rmt = the return on the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki PI in time t. 
ARit = the abnormal return on security i on time t 
 
 
After the abnormal returns are calculated the average cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated with the following equation: 
 






Where the 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the average abnormal return. The number of trading day is notified 
as n.  
 
The null hypothesis 𝐻0 is that the average abnormal return in event window period is 
zero. If insiders’ trades have no impact on stock returns the average abnormal return 
should be zero. The alternative hypotheses are that the average abnormal return is above 
zero after insider’s purchase and after insider’s disposal the average abnormal return is 
below zero. Therefore, equations are following: 
 
(4)          𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 0 
               𝐻1: 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 > 0 




After the results of the abnormal returns are calculated, the results must be tested. The 




(5)          𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑆/√𝑛
~𝑡(𝑛  1) 
 
 
Where the 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the average cumulative abnormal return on stock in day i. S is a 
standard deviation and notation n is number of trading days.  
 
 
5.3. Possible problems with using market model and estimating abnormal returns  
 
 
When the market model was chosen as a methodology in this study, certain assumptions 
must be done. In this section the assumptions and possible issues are explained. The pos-
sible issues might corrupt the results or cause problems when testing the results. 
 
5.3.1. Problems with normality of abnormal returns 
 
When using residuals of the market model as a proxy of abnormal returns we must do 
assumptions. One of the assumptions is that abnormal returns are normally distributed 
(Kasanen 1999: 72).  
 
(6)          𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁 (0, σ2) 
 
According to Brown and Warner (1985), stock returns are not normally distributed 
whether they are measured as daily, weekly, or monthly. However, daily returns deviated 
the most from normal distribution. If daily returns are not normally distributed, it indi-
cates that daily abnormal returns are not normally distributed either (Kasanen 1999: 72-
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73). According Kasanen (1999), the distribution might be skewed and have high kurtosis. 
Therefore, the results might be unreliable when using residuals of the market model. 
 
The sum of the residuals of the market model and averages are more normally distributed. 
According Kasanen (1999), even the 5 days sum of residuals are more normally distrib-
uted than individual residuals. Skewness and kurtosis decreased from 2,11 and 16,98 to -
0,16 and -0,48, respectively, when Kasanen (1999: 72-73) used sum of 5 days residuals 
instead of daily residuals. The research of Brown and Warner (1985) supports this: They 
found that even daily returns are non-normally distributed, it has no impact on event study 
methodologies because as the number of sample securities increases the mean abnormal 
return converges to close to normality.  
 
5.3.2. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of abnormal returns 
 
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the error terms’ variance varies highly and systematically 
when variable x changes. Heteroskedasticity is not harmful for regression factor but it 
might have impact on statistical significance. (Kvantimotv 2003)  
 
The variability of returns variance causes heteroskedasticity to market model’s error 
terms and might have an issue when calculating abnormal returns’ statistical significance. 
The problem occurs if variance increases around to the event. The statistical significance 
test might show too favourable results and it leads to rejection of the null hypotheses too 
easily. It is common that in event studies, the following assumption is made: 
 
(7)          𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑖 =  𝜎2 
 
The assumption means that the variance of residuals stays constant over the time. There-
fore, the variance of residuals can be used to test the statistical significance of abnormal 
returns. (Kasanen 1999: 73-74) 
 
One of the possible issues of modelling abnormal returns is autocorrelation. This issue is 
regarding to non-normality of residuals. The residuals are not normally distributed, but 
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they are correlated. This can be a problem of reliability of the research. (Kasanen 1999: 
74)  
 
5.3.3.  Problems with benchmark index 
 
One assumption which is made when using the market model is that β coefficient is con-
stant. According Kasanen (1999: 74-75), using the changing β-estimation, it could im-
prove the market model’s ability to reduce the variance of residual. However, there is no 
clear evidence of its usefulness in event studies. He used both β-estimations and found 
that there was no difference whether he used changing β-estimation which was constant 
over time.  
 
When calculating β-estimations, the benchmark index needs to be decided because β-
estimations of the stocks are calculated according to the benchmark index. The bench-
mark portfolio should lie in mean-variance efficient frontier. If the decided benchmark 
portfolio OMX Helsinki PI does not lie in the mean-variance efficient frontier, this might 














In this section the descriptive data and the results of empirical part are presented. The 
descriptive data sections consist of information of the data used in this thesis. Then the 
results of the profitability of insiders’ trades are presented. This section contains the re-
sults of the total sample and then the data is cut into smaller samples based on the firm 
size and type of insider.  
 
6.1 Descriptive data 
 
Insiders made total of 1849 transactions which are suitable in this thesis in 1.7.2016-
1.7.2019. Transactions which are excluded from the data are presented in the data section. 
Total of 117 companies’ insiders’ trades are included in this thesis.  
 
Insider trades are divided to purchases and disposals. The purchase day is determined 
when insiders of the company net purchased in a specific day and disposal day when the 
insiders sell more than buy. In the period 1.7.2016-1.7.2019 there are a total of 754 pur-
chase days and 376 disposal days. Therefore, the total trading days are 1130. Nokia Cor-
poration has the most active insiders. They made 101 transactions. However, the transac-
tions were mainly made in the same days when there are only 16 purchase days and 7 
disposal days. Even though share-based incentives and other derivative products are ex-
cluded from the data, it is interesting that the total of 16 companies’ insiders made 0 
transactions.  
 
All three company size groups had more purchase days than selling days. Small cap com-
panies’ insiders have 220 purchase days and 100 disposal days. Mid cap companies have 
240 purchase days and 169 disposal days. Large cap companies have the greatest number 
of purchase days with 294 purchase days while their insiders sold holdings only in 107 






 Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Type of insider Small cap Mid cap Large cap Total trading days 
 
Purchases 
    
Board member  150   113  193 456 
Other senior management 20 55 48 123 
Chief executive officer  50 72 53 175 
Disposals     
Board member 61 51 15 127 
Other senior management 23 99 87 209 
Chief executive officer  16 19 5 40 
 
 
Table 2 shows how insiders’ purchase and disposal trading days varies between the type 
of insider. Insiders are divided in to the three groups: board members, other senior man-
agement, and chief executive officers. In table 2 the insiders are divided into groups also 
based on the size of the company.  
 
Table 2 shows that the most active group for purchases was board members. Board mem-
bers purchased in 456 different days while the most inactive group was other senior man-
agement with 123 purchase trading days. Chief executive officers were relatively active 
group with 175 purchase trading days. The number of chief executive officers trading 
days is quite high if considering the amount of chief executive officers compared to board 
members and other senior management in the companies. The reasons for chief executive 
officers’ relatively large purchase trading days amount might be that they have the most 
interest to show their trust to their companies’ performance by purchasing stocks of the 
company they are managing. For disposal trading days the other senior management 
group was the most active group with 209 disposal trading days. The group was the only 
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group which had more disposal days than purchase days. Chief executive officers had the 
smallest number of disposal days in every firm-size groups. Chief executive officers in 
mid-cap firms had 19 disposal days while chief executive officers had only 5 disposal 
days.  
 
6.2. Profitability of insiders’ trades 
 
In this section, the profitability of insiders’ trades is presented. The results in all tables 
are given in average daily abnormal returns. First the data is divided into purchases and 
disposals but later in this section the data is divided into smaller parts. The sample is 
divided based on the size of the firm and type of insider.  
 
6.2.1. Total sample 
 
 Table 3. Insider trades profitability for total sample. 
Event period Average daily abnormal  
return for purchases 
Average daily abnormal re-
turn for disposals 














Observations     754     376 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***. **. * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% & 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
In the table 3, average daily abnormal returns are presented for the whole sample in dif-
ferent event periods which are 5 days, 10 days, and 30 days. The whole sample is divided 




Table 3 shows that in every event period the stocks prices rise abnormally for purchases. 
Daily average abnormal for purchases in 5 days event period is 0,11% (t-statistics 3,29). 
Table 3 shows that when the event period rises, the average daily abnormal return de-
clines. For the 10 days event period the daily average abnormal return is 0,08% (t-statis-
tics 4,19) and for 30 days event period 0,06% (t-statistics 5,65). However, the t-statistics 
seem to grow the longer the period is. All abnormal returns in every event period are 
statistically significant at 99% confidence level.  
 
For disposal stock prices decrease in every event periods. For 5 days event period the 
abnormal return is -0,12% and its statistically significant at 99% confidence level. When 
the period lengthens abnormal returns decrease so it seems to be quite the same pattern in 
average daily abnormal returns for disposals than average daily abnormal return for pur-
chases. For 10 days event period stock prices decrease -0,06% (t-statistics -2,09) and it is 
statistically significant at 95 % confidence level. For 30 days event period the average 
daily abnormal return is -0,07% (t-statistics -4,41) and it is statistically significant at 99% 
confidence level.  
 
Results indicate that insiders have earned abnormal returns whether they bought or sold 
their companies’ stocks. Abnormal returns hold even the event period grows. 
 
6.2.2 Firm size 
 
In this section the data is divided based on the market size of the company. Table 4 shows 
how firm size matters to profitability of insiders’ transactions. Firms are divided into 
small-cap, mid-cap and large-cap. There are three different event windows presented in 




Table 4. Firm size. 
Event window Small cap Mid cap          Large cap 
    
Purchases 
    
5 days 0,23%***  0,05% 0,07%* 
        (2,73) (0,88) (1,86) 
10 days 0,13%***  0,04% 0,08%*** 
         (2,90) (1,15) (3,14) 
 
30 days 0,10%***  0,04%** 0,04%*** 
 (4,70) (2,33) (2,73) 
 
Observations 220 240 294 
 
Disposals    
    
5 days -0,32%*** -0,05% -0,04% 
  (-2,89) (-0,78) (-0,90) 
10 days -0,23%*** 0,02% -0,02% 
  (-3,30) (0,60) (-0,60) 
 
30 days -0,15%*** -0,02% -0,06%*** 
  (-3,99) (-1,04) (-2,75) 
 
Observations 100 169 107 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***. **. * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% & 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
 
Small cap firms’ insiders earned abnormal returns by their purchases. When the event 
window is 5 days insiders earned abnormal daily return 0,23% (t-statistics 2,73). Average 
abnormal return decreases when the length of the event window grows. After 10 days 
daily abnormal return was 0,13% (t-statistics 2,90) and after 30 days insiders earned 
0,10% (t-statistics 4,70) daily on average. In every event window the returns are statisti-




After small cap firms’ insiders’ disposals stock prices tend to decrease whether the event 
window is 5 days, 10 days or 30 days. Stock prices decreased -0,32% (t-statistics -2,89) 
when the event window was set to 5 days. Abnormal returns appear even when the event 
window’s length increases to 10 days or 30 days. After 10 days from the transaction the 
daily average abnormal return was -0,23% (t-statistics -3,30) and after 30 days it is still -
0,15% (t-statistics -3,99). Abnormal returns are statistically significant at 99% confidence 
level despite the lengthening of the event period. However, statistical significance in-
creases when the event period is longer. 
 
When comparing to small cap companies’ insiders’ trades, the results are different when 
an insider in the mid cap companies purchases. They earned abnormal returns r in every 
event window but only in 30 days event window the abnormal daily return was statisti-
cally significant. They earned 0,04% (t-statistics 2,33) in 30 days event period. The results 
for disposals are interesting. Abnormal returns are not statistically significant but still in 
5 days event period stock prices decreased by -0,05% (t-statistics -0,78). In 10 days, ab-
normal return was 0,02% (t-statistics 0,60) so the sign is wrong. After 30 days the sign 
turns back to minus and abnormal return was -0,02% (t-statistics-1,04).  
 
Table 4 shows that insiders from large cap companies earned abnormal return by their 
trades. In event period of 5 days, daily abnormal earnings for insiders were 0,07% (t-
statistics 1,86). Abnormal returns are statistically significant at 90% confidence level. 
Abnormal returns for large cap insiders’ trades hold even when the length of the event 
period grow. After 10 days from the trade, insider earned daily 0,08% (t-statistics 3,14) 
abnormal returns. Abnormal returns appear even the length of the event window is 30 
days. Insiders earned 0,04% (t-statistics 2,73) and abnormal returns are statistically sig-
nificant at 99% confidence level. After insiders’ disposals stock prices tend to decrease. 
After 5 days, stock prices had abnormally decreased daily -0,04% and -0,02% after 10 
days. However, the daily abnormal returns are not statistically significant. After 30 days 
from the insider’s trade abnormal return increases to -0,06% (t-statistics -2,75) and it is 




In table 4 we can notice that firm size has an impact on insider’s abnormal returns. Table 
5 shows that trades made by insiders from small cap companies was the group who earned 
the most abnormal returns in period 1.7.2016-1.7.2019. They earned remarkably abnor-
mal returns whether they purchased or sold their stocks. Abnormal returns were all sta-
tistically significant at 99% confidence level. Insider’s at mid cap and large cap compa-
nies earned abnormal returns as well, but much less than small cap companies’ insiders. 
Also, the results are not statistically significant at all event windows. 
 
6.2.3 Type of the insider 
 
In table 5, average daily abnormal returns for purchases and disposals are presented. In 
this table the sample is divided by the type of the insider. Insiders are divided into three 



















      Table 5. Type of insider. 
     T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***. **. * indicate statistical significance at  
1%, 5% & 10% level, respectively.  
 
Type of insider Avg. daily abnormal 
return for purchases 
 Avg. daily abnormal 
return for disposals 
Board member 
5 days                        
 
0,10%*** 





10 days 0,08%*** 




30 days 0,08%*** 




Observations      456  127 
Other senior management    
5 days                        0,05% 




10 days 0,05% 









Observations      123    209 
Chief executive officer    




















Table 5 shows that board members earned abnormal returns for purchases whether the 
event window was 5 days, 10 days, or 30 days. Board members earned daily abnormal 
returns 0,10% (t-statistics 2,62) in 5 days event period. For longer event periods the ab-
normal returns still hold. For 10 days and 30 days event periods the average abnormal 
daily return was 0,08% with t-statistics 3,65 and 6,10, respectively. For the disposals that 
board members did, the average daily abnormal return was -0,08% (t-statistics -0,99) 
when the event period was 5 days. However, the abnormal return is not statistically sig-
nificant. In event period of 10 days the abnormal return decreases to -0,01% (t-statistics 
-0,27). Only statistically significant with 90% confidence level is board members’ dis-
posals when event window is 30 days. Average daily abnormal return is -0,06% (t-statis-
tics -1,87).  
 
Table 5 shows that the group of other senior management earned daily abnormal returns 
after 5, 10 and 30 days after their purchases. Abnormal returns were 0,05%, 0,05% and 
0,04%, respectively. However, none of the abnormal returns were statistically significant. 
Other senior management were more active to sell their stocks than buy. Observation for 
purchases was 123 and for disposal it was 209. After 5 days, when other senior manage-
ment sold their stocks the stocks’ prices decreased daily on average by -0,11% (t-statistics 
-2,16). The same result happened after 10 days but the daily average abnormal return 
decreased to -0,06% (t-statistics -1,67). Daily abnormal return stays in -0,06% in 30 days 
event period and it is highly statistically significant (t-statistics -3,24).  
 
Chief executive officers were the group which earned the most abnormal returns. Table 
5 shows that, in 5 days event period chief executive officers earned daily abnormal returns 
0,18% (t-statistics 1,98) and abnormal returns was statistically significant at 95% confi-
dence level. Daily abnormal return seems to decrease when event period grows. In 10 
days event period the daily abnormal return has decreased to 0,10%. However, statistical 
significance still holds. After chief executive officers sell their stocks, the stock prices 
decrease significantly. Daily abnormal returns are markable despite the event period 
length. After chief executive officer’s disposal, the daily average abnormal return in 5 
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days event period is -0,26% (t-statistics -2,07). Abnormal returns are statistically signifi-
cant at 95% confidence level. Abnormal returns remain even if the event period is longer. 
10 days after the chief executive officer’s disposal the average daily abnormal return for 
the period was -0,20% (t-statistics -2,84). Abnormal returns are statistically significant at 
99% confidence level.  Daily abnormal returns decrease a little when the length of the 
period is 30 days. The daily abnormal return is -0,13 (t-statistics -3,14) on average and it 
is statistically significant at 99% confidence level.  
 
Overall, the results show clearly that insiders earned abnormal returns regardless of their 
status in the company or how long the event period was. Mainly all abnormal returns were 
statistically significant except board members’ disposals and other senior managements’ 
purchases. Chief executive officers’ disposals were the most profitable – however it 






6.2.4. Type of insider and firm size 
 
Table 6. Profitability of CEO's transactions. 
Event window Small cap Mid cap Large cap 
    
Purchases    
5 days 0,44% 0,09% 0,07% 
 (1,61) (0,99) (0,65) 
10 days 0,15% 0,08% 0,08% 
 (1,11) (1,36) (1,13) 
 
30 days 0,05% 0,03% -0,04% 
 (1,09) (1,04) (-1,10) 
Observations 50 72 53 
Disposals    
    
5 days -0,39%* -0,17% -0,19% 
 (-1,80) (-0,87) (-1,83) 
10 days -0,24%* -0,21%** 0,01% 
 (-1,86) (-2,30) (0,05) 
 
30 days -0,27%*** -0,09% 0,13% 
 (-5,60) (-1,49) (0,89) 
Observations 16 19 5 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***. **. * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% & 





In table 6, the sample is divided into chief executive managers’ transactions and it is also 
divided based on the firm size.  
 
Table 6 shows that small cap companies’ chief executive officers’ transactions were the 
most profitable. They earned 0,44% (t-statistics 1,61) abnormal returns daily by their pur-
chases when the event window was 5 days. When the event period is lengthened to 10 
days the daily abnormal returns decreased to 0,15 % (t-statistics 1,11). After 30 days from 
the purchase, a small cap company chief executive officer has earned 0,05% (t-statistics 
1,09) daily abnormal returns. Even though the chief executive officers at small cap com-
panies earned abnormal returns by their purchases, abnormal returns were not statistically 
significant. The results are stronger after small cap companies’ chief executive officers’ 
disposals. After 5 days from the disposal, stock prices have decreased abnormally -0,39% 
(t-statistics -1,80). The result is quite the same after 10 days from the disposal. Stock 
prices have abnormally decreased -0,24% (t-statistics -1,86). In both event windows, ab-
normal returns are statistically significant at 90% confidence level. When setting the event 
window to 30 days, the stock prices decreased abnormally -0,27% (t-statistics-5,60) per 
day after chief executive officers’ trades. Daily abnormal returns are statistically signifi-
cant at 99% confidence level.  
 
Chief executive officers in mid cap companies made purchases in 72 different days and 
sold their stocks in 19 different days. They earned abnormal returns after their purchases 
whether the event window was set to 5 days, 10 days, or 30 days from the transaction. 
Daily abnormal returns were 0,09% (t-statistics 0,99), 0,08% (t-statistics 1,36) and 0,03% 
(t-statistics 1,04), respectively. However, the abnormal returns were not statistically sig-
nificant. 
 
After the disposal of a chief executive officer in a mid-cap company, the stock prices 
decrease abnormally. 5 days from the disposal, the stock prices have daily decreased ab-
normally -0,17% (t-statistics -0,87). 10 days from the disposal, the effect is stronger. The 
stock prices have daily decreased abnormally -0,21% (t-statistics -2,30). In the event win-
dow of 30 days the abnormal return was -0,09% (t-statistics -1,49). Abnormal returns 




The result was different after large cap companies’ chief executive officers’ transactions. 
In shorter event windows they earned abnormal returns after their purchases. They earned 
daily abnormal return of 0,07% (t-statistics 0,65) when the event window was 5 days and 
0,08% (t-statistics 1,13) in 10 days period. The abnormal returns are not statistically sig-
nificant. After 30 days from the purchase, chief executive officers’ returns turned to neg-
ative and was -0,04% (t-statistics 1,10). However, neither in 30 days event window the 
abnormal returns were not statistically significant. The results are quite similar after chief 
executive officers’ disposal. In the shorter event window, the stock prices decrease but 
when setting the event period to 30 days, the abnormal return turns to positive and the 
stock prices increase daily 0,13% (t-statistics 0,89).  All the results are statistically insig-
nificant.  
 
Overall, the chief executive officers earned abnormal returns by their purchases regard-
less of the size of the company they manage. Chief executive officers’ in small cap com-
panies’ purchases were significantly the most profitable. However, none of the abnormal 
returns are statistically significant. Chief executive officers’ disposals in small cap com-
panies had an impact on stock returns. Stock prices decreased significantly after their 
disposals. Abnormal returns were statistically significant, especially when event window 
was 30 days. The issue when analysing the results of chief executive officers’ disposals 
is the small number of observations. For example, large cap companies’ chief executive 




Table 7. Profitability of other senior management's transactions. 
Event window Small cap Mid cap Large cap 
    
Purchases    
5 days 0,18% 0,12% -0,08% 
 (0,85) (1,10) (-0,61) 
10 days 0,12% 0,06% 0,01% 
 (1,32) (0,86) (0,14) 
 
30 days 0,05% 0,06%* -0,00% 
 (0,73) (1,91)  (-0,00) 
Observations 20 55 48 
Disposals    
    
5 days -0,47%* -0,11% -0,03% 
 (-1,75) (-1,42) (-0,46) 
10 days -0,34%** -0,04% 0,01% 
 (-2,25) (-0,88) (0,16) 
 
30 days -0,06% -0,05%*       -0,07%*** 
 (-0,76) (-1,75) (-3,12) 
Observations 23 99 87 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***. **. * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% &  
10% level, respectively. 
 
In table 7, the transactions made by other senior management are presented. They are 
divided into three groups based on firm size. Other senior management was the only group 
that had more disposal days than purchase days when the data is divided by the type of 
insider.  
Other senior management in small cap companies was quite inactive in period 1.7.2016-
1.7.2019. They had only 20 purchase days and 23 disposal days. The stock prices in-
creased abnormally whether the event window was set to 5 days, 10 days, or 30 days. The 
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other senior management earned abnormally 0,18% (t-statistics 0,85) daily when the 
event window was set to 5 days. After 10 days and 30 days, the other senior management 
earned daily abnormal return of 0,12% (t-statistics 1,32) and 0,05% (t-statistics 0,73), 
respectively. None of the abnormal returns were statistically significant in any event win-
dow. After the other senior management’s disposals, the stock prices seem to abnormally 
decrease.  When the event window is set to 5 days, the stock prices decreased abnormally 
-0,47% (t-statistics -1,75) per day. The abnormal returns are statistically significant at 
90% confidence level. After 10 days from the other senior management’s disposal, the 
stock prices have still decreased abnormally -0,34% (t-statistics 2,25) daily and the ab-
normal returns are statistically significant at 95% confidence level. After 30 days from 
the disposal, the effect is smaller and the daily abnormal returns decreased to -0,06 (t-
statistics -0,76) and it is statistically insignificant.  
 
Mid cap companies’ other senior management were the most active group measured in 
purchase days and disposal days. They net purchased in 55 days and net sold their stocks 
in 99 days. Table 7 shows that they earned abnormal returns 0,12% (t-statistics 1,10) daily 
when the event window was set to 5 days. Abnormal returns are also earned 0,06% daily 
by the other senior management after longer periods from the purchase. Abnormal returns 
are statistically significant at 90% confidence level only when the event window is 30 
days. With other event windows, abnormal returns are statistically insignificant. The re-
sult is quite similar when the other senior management sold their stocks. The abnormal 
return occurs after the other senior management’s disposal and it is strongest after the 
longer event period. The stock prices decreased abnormally -0,11% daily in 5 days event 
period. The abnormal returns are not statistically significant. After 30 days from the dis-
posal the stock prices abnormally decreased -0,05% (t-statistics -1,75) on average. The 
abnormal returns are statistically significant at 90 % confidence level. 
 
Table 7 shows that the other senior management in the large cap companies was more 
active to sell their stocks than buy. They net purchased in 48 different days and sold their 
stocks in 87 different days. After the other senior management’s purchase, the stock prices 
seem to decrease abnormally -0,08% after 5 days from the transaction. After a longer 
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period, the profitability of their trades turns to breakeven. Therefore, it can be suggested 
that the other senior management in the large cap companies did not earn abnormal re-
turns by their purchases. 5 days from the disposal made by large cap companies’ other 
senior management, the stock prices decreased by -0,03% (t-statistics -0,46). After 10 
days, the profitability of the transaction changed to almost breakeven. The stock prices 
turn to downtrend when the event window is 30 days. The stock prices decreased abnor-
mally -0,07% (t-statistics -3,12). The abnormal returns are statistically significant at 99 
% confidence level.  
 
As a conclusion, the other senior management in the small cap and mid cap companies 
earned abnormal returns by their purchases but returns were not statistically significant. 
The purchases made by the other senior management in the large cap companies had no 
impact on stock returns. After the disposal, the stock prices decreased regardless of the 
size of the company. However, table 7 shows that the abnormal returns are the largest in 
shorter event periods when the other senior management in small caps sells their stocks. 
Then again, when the other senior management in mid cap or large cap companies sells 




Table 8. Profitability of board members' transactions. 
    
Event window Small cap Mid cap Large cap 
    
Purchases    
5 days 0,17%** -0,01% 0,11%*** 
 (2,10) (-0,16) (2,70) 
10 days 0,12%*** -0,00% 0,10%*** 
 (2,66) (-0,07) (3,47) 
 
30 days 0,11%***  0,03% -0,00% 
 (4,98) (1,25)  (-0,00) 
Observations 150 113 193 
Disposals    
5 days -0,24%*   0,13% -0,10% 
 (-1,73) (1,44) (-0,81) 
10 days -0,18%*         0,23%*** -0,18%** 
 (-1,97) (3,80) (-2,23) 
 
30 days  -0,15%***  0,06%*      -0,04% 
 (-2,97)   (1,88) (-0,79) 
Observations 61 51 15 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***. **. * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% &  
10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 8 contains the results of board members’ transactions’ impact on stock returns. In 
this table they are divided by the size of the firm. Board members were more active to 
buy stocks than sell regardless of the size of the company.  
 
The board members in small cap companies earned abnormal returns after their purchases. 
In the period of 5 days, they earned 0,17% (t-statistics 2,10) abnormal returns per day. 
The abnormal returns are statistically significant at 95 % confidence level. After 10 days 
from the purchase, the daily abnormal return was 0,12% (t-statistics 2,66) daily on aver-
age. The abnormal returns exist even if the event period is set to 30 days. On average, the 
55 
 
board members in small cap companies earned 0,11% (t-statistics 4,98) daily abnormal 
returns. The abnormal returns were statistically significant at 99 % confidence level. The 
same result can be seen after board members’ disposal. The stock prices decreased daily 
abnormally -0,24 % (t-statistics -1,73) in 5 days event period. The stock prices kept de-
creasing after 10 days from the transaction of the insider and was -0,18% (t-statistics -
1,97). The abnormal returns are statistically significant at 90 % confidence level in both 
event windows. After 30 days from the disposal, the impact is even stronger. The stock 
prices decreased abnormally -0,15 % (t-statistics -2,97) per day and it is statistically sig-
nificant at 99 % confidence level.  
 
Overall, it can be stated that the board members in small cap companies successfully 
timed their transactions in period of 1.7.2016-1.7.2019. They earned abnormal returns 
after their transactions whether they purchased or sold the stocks. The abnormal returns 
are the largest when the event window is set to 30 days.  
 
Board members in mid cap companies net purchased in 113 trading days while they net 
sold their stocks in 51 different trading days. Their purchases had no impact on stock 
returns. The board members in mid cap companies did not earn abnormal returns by their 
purchases. Results for the board members in mid cap companies’ disposals are interesting. 
After their disposals, the stock prices increased daily 0,13 % (t-statistics 1,44) after 5 
days. Their abnormal losses are even greater after 10 days. The stock prices increased 
abnormally 0,23% (t-statistics 3,80) per day. The results in the 10 days event window is 
statistically significant at 99 % confidence level. The results of the transactions made by 
the board members in the mid cap companies differs a lot from the results of the other 
groups. 
 
Table 8 shows that the board members of large cap companies were the most active group 
to buy their companies’ stocks. The group had 193 purchase days while they sold their 
stocks only in 15 different trading days. After 5 days from the purchase, the board mem-
bers earned abnormal returns 0,11% (t-statistics 2,70) per day. The abnormal returns are 
statistically significant at 99% confidence level. The profitability of the purchases 
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increased when the event window is set to 10 days. They earned daily abnormal returns 
of 0,10% (t-statistics 3,47) on average. The result is statistically significant at 99% con-
fidence level. After 30 days from the purchase, the abnormal returns disappear and the 
profitability of the transaction turns to zero.  
 
Table 8 shows that after a board member’s disposal, the stock prices abnormally start to 
decrease. When the event window is set to 5 days, the stock prices decreased daily -0,10% 
(t-statistics -0,81). However, the result is statistically insignificant. The stock prices con-
tinue to decrease when the event window is longer and after 10 days from the disposal by 
the board member the decrease is -0,18% (t-statistics -2,23) per day. The result is statis-
tically significant at 95 % confidence level. However, after 30 days the daily abnormal 






Table 9. Main findings in subsamples. 





















      









      










      
Observations 220 100 40 456 16 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***. **. * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% & 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
Table 9 consists of main findings from regressions where the data was divided based on 
firm-size or the type of the insider. Insiders from the small cap companies earned 1,15% 
cumulative abnormal returns after 5 days from the purchase. In 30 day event window, the 
stock prices had cumulatively increased abnormally 2,84% after insider’s purchase. The 
impact is even higher after the disposal of the insider. Stock prices decreased cumula-
tively -1,59% after 5 days from the disposal. Abnormal returns holds when the event 
window is set to longer window. After 10 days from the disposal, the cumulative abnor-
mal return was -2,29% and -4,57% in 30 days after the disposal. The results are statisti-




The type of the insider seems to have an effect on stock returns. Table 9 shows that after 
a board member’s purchase, the stock prices cumulatively increased abnormally 2,30% 
in 30 days. After a CEO’s disposal the impact on stock prices is remarkable. The stock 
prices decrease -4,02% in 30 days after the CEO’s disposal. Even higher impact occurs 
when the CEO of a small cap company makes a disposal. The stock prices decreased on 
average over -8% cumulatively in 30 days after the CEO’s disposal. However, the number 
of observations was only 16 so the result can be considered more directive than reliable. 
 
As a conclusion, it can be said that the results vary between the groups. It matters whether 
the board member is in a small cap, mid cap, or large company. By following the board 
members of small cap companies, an investor can earn abnormal returns. The investor 
can earn abnormal returns by following board member from large cap companies, but 
abnormal returns seem to decrease when the time frame is longer. By following mid cap 














The purpose of the study was to examine whether insiders can earn abnormal returns by 
their trades and whether an investor can earn abnormal returns by following the insiders. 
The results of prior studies show that insiders have earned abnormal returns by their 
trades. Most of the previous researches on insider trading are international and there is 
only one published study in the Finnish market that is from 1999. As the results of the 
international studies show that insiders have earned abnormal returns, the motivation to 
examine the Finnish market in a newer period increase. The data of this study includes 
117 companies which are listed in Helsinki OMX. The period of time is 1.7.2016-
1.7.2019.  
 
The null hypothesis of the study is that insider trades have no impact on stock returns. 
Whether insiders purchase or sell the stocks of their own company, insiders cannot earn 
abnormal returns by their trades. The alternative hypotheses are that insiders’ trades have 
impact on stock returns. Insiders earn abnormal returns after purchase and after insiders’ 
sale, the abnormal return is below zero.  
 
 
(8)          𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 0 
               𝐻1: 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 > 0 
               𝐻2: 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 < 0 
 
The results show that insiders earned abnormal returns by their trades in Helsinki OMX 
in period of 1.7.2016-1.7.2019. Therefore, 𝐻0 can be rejected and hypotheses 𝐻1 and 𝐻2 
are accepted for the total sample. 
 
The results for total sample show that insiders earned remarkable abnormal returns by 
their trades. The abnormal returns were tested with different event windows and no matter 
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what the length of the event window was or the nature of the transaction, the abnormal 
returns were statistically significant at 99% confidence level. Only insiders’ disposals 
with 10 days event window were statistically significant at 95% confidence level. In-
sider’s earned cumulative abnormal returns 0,55% in 5 days after the purchase, 0,80% 
after 10 days from the purchase and when the event window was set to 30 days, insiders 
earned 1,68% cumulative abnormal returns by their purchase. After insiders’ disposal, the 
stock returns turned to negative. After 5 days from the insider’s disposal, the cumulative 
abnormal return was -0,59%. When the event window was set to 10 days, the cumulative 
abnormal return was -0,57%. Stock prices continued to decrease and in 30 days event 
window the cumulative abnormal return was -2,00%.  
 
 
In this study, the sample is divided to smaller groups based on the size of the company or 
the type of the insider. Companies were divided to the three different groups: small cap, 
mid cap and large cap. The distribution is grounded on the market capitalisation of the 
companies. Also, the insiders were divided to the three groups which are board members, 
other senior management, and chief executive officers. 
 
Lakonishok et al (2001) find that trades made by an insider from small cap companies 
had higher impact on stock prices. The same findings can be seen in this study. In 30 day 
event window, the stock prices had cumulatively increased abnormally 2,84% after in-
sider’s purchase. The impact is even higher after the disposal of the insider. Stock prices 
decreased cumulatively -4,57% in 30 days after the disposal.  The results are statistically 
significant at 99% confidence level.   
 
The type of the insider seems to influence to stock returns. After the board member’s 
purchase, the stock prices cumulatively increased abnormally 2,30% (t-statistics 6,09) in 
30 days. After a CEO’s disposal the impact on stock prices is remarkable. The stock prices 
decrease -4,02% in 30 days after the CEO’s disposal. Even higher impact occurs when 
the CEO of a small cap company makes a disposal. The stock prices decreased on average 
over -8% cumulatively in 30 days after the CEO’s disposal. However, the number of ob-
servations was only 16 so the result can be considered more directive than reliable. Chief 
executive officers’ trades’ impact on stock returns in the Finnish markets would be 
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interesting to examine with a larger number of observations. This study does not explain 
the reason for insiders’ abnormal returns. The natural reason might be that other investors 
follow what insiders do and therefore give pressure for stock prices to increase or de-
crease, whether an insider purchase or sell, respectively. On the other hand, an insider 
might have non-public information that firm’s performance is going to enhance or weaken 
and that gives the movement pressure for the stock prices. For future research, a more 
fundamental approach would be interesting in which it is examined how companies’ fun-
damentals change after an insider’s transaction in longer periods. 
 
As a conclusion, insiders earned abnormal returns during 1.7.2016-1.7.2019, thus the null 
hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypotheses are accepted. The results show that 
the firm size and the type of the insider has an impact on the stock price. The results also 
indicate that the Finnish stock market is not efficient while insiders can earn abnormal 
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Afarak Group Mid Cap 0 8 8 8 
Ahlstrom-Munksjö Oyj Large Cap 7 0 7 10 
Aktia Bank Plc Mid Cap 11 25 36 98 
Alma Media Corp. Mid Cap 9 1 10 27 
Apetit Oyj Small Cap 3 1 4 5 
Asiakastieto Group Mid Cap 1 0 1 2 
Aspo Plc Mid Cap 4 6 10 12 
Aspocomp Group Plc Small Cap 3 2 5 6 
Atria Plc Mid Cap 5 0 5 5 
Bank of Åland Plc A Mid Cap 3 1 4 4 
Bank of Åland Plc B Mid Cap 17 0 17 18 
Basware Oyj Mid Cap 10 3 13 22 
Biohit Oyj Small Cap 1 9 10 15 
Bittium Oyj Mid Cap 1 1 2 2 
Capman Plc Mid Cap 11 2 13 15 
Cargotec Oyj Large Cap 7 2 9 9 
Caverion Oyj Mid Cap 33 1 34 36 
Citycon Oyj Large Cap 72 0 72 79 
Componenta Corp. Small Cap 1 0 1 1 
Consti Plc Small Cap 3 7 10 11 
Cramo Oyj Mid Cap 24 0 24 36 
Digia Plc Small Cap 7 0 7 8 
Digitalist Group Plc Small Cap 2 0 2 4 
Dovre Group Plc Small Cap 16 6 22 26 
Efore Oyj Small Cap 8 1 9 10 
Elecster Oyj Small Cap 0 0 0 0 
Elisa Oyj Large Cap 3 9 12 31 
Eq Oyj Mid Cap 5 5 10 26 
Etteplan Oyj Mid Cap 0 25 25 30 
Evli Bank Oyj Mid Cap 7 7 14 22 
Exel Composites Plc Small Cap 8 0 8 9 
F-secure Corp. Mid Cap 8 3 11 11 
Finnair Oyj Mid Cap 3 1 4 4 
Fiskars Corp. Large Cap 3 0 3 4 
Fortum Corp. Large Cap 1 1 2 2 
Glaston Corp. Small Cap 3 0 3 3 
HKScan Oyj Mid Cap 3 0 3 3 
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Honkarakenne Oyj Small Cap 8 0 8 11 
Huhtamäki Oyj Large Cap 5 22 27 29 
Ilkka-Yhtymä Oyj  Small Cap 1 0 1 2 
Incap Corp. Small Cap 0 10 10 23 
Innofactor Oyj Small Cap 9 0 9 10 
Investors House Oy Small Cap 4 4 8 20 
Kemira Oyj Large Cap 8 1 9 9 
Keskisuomalainen Oyj Small Cap 6 0 6 6 
Kesko Corp. A Large Cap 1 0 1 2 
Kesko Corp. B Large Cap 1 1 2 2 
Kesla Oyj  Small Cap 0 0 0 0 
Kone Oyj Large Cap 19 9 28 35 
Konecranes Abp Large Cap 15 4 19 71 
Lassila & Tikanoja Plc Mid Cap 2 0 2 2 
Lehto Group Oyj Mid Cap 7 2 9 16 
Marimekko Oyj Mid Cap 7 0 7 27 
Martela Oyj Small Cap 1 0 1 1 
Metso Oyj Large Cap 3 1 4 4 
Metsä Board Oyj B Large Cap 1 0 1 1 
Metsä Board Oyj A Large Cap 0 0 0 0 
Neo Industrial Oyj Small Cap 6 8 14 14 
Neste Corp. Large Cap 6 25 31 37 
Nixu Oyj Small Cap 1 0 1 1 
Noho Partners Oyj Mid Cap 0 0 0 0 
Nokia Corp. Large Cap 16 7 23 101 
Nokian Tyres Large Cap 2 1 3 3 
Nordea Large Cap 3 0 3 4 
Nurminen Logistics Plc Small Cap 1 0 1 11 
Olvi Plc A Mid Cap 2 6 8 9 
Oriola Oyj A Mid Cap 0 0 0 0 
Oriola Oyj B Mid Cap 16 0 16 69 
Orion Corp. A Large Cap 3 0 3 4 
Orion Corp. B Large Cap 2 13 15 33 
Outokumpu Oyj Large Cap 32 1 33 35 
Outotec Oyj Mid Cap 12 0 12 69 
Ovaro Kiinteistösijoitus Oyj Small Cap 31 22 53 75 
Panostaja Oyj Small Cap 5 0 5 23 
Pihlajalina Oyj Mid Cap 2 1 3 9 
Plc Uutecnhinc Group Oyj Small Cap 1 0 1 3 
Ponsse Oyj Mid Cap 5 1 6 10 
Punamusta Media Small Cap 1 0 1 6 
QPR Software Oyj Small Cap 0 0 0 0 
Raisio Plc Mid Cap 7 1 8 8 
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Rapala VMC Corp. Small Cap 8 0 8 15 
Raute Corp. Small Cap 0 7 7 21 
Revenio Group Mid Cap 4 29 33 37 
Saga Furs Oyj Small Cap 0 0 0 0 
Sampo Plc Large Cap 5 6 11 35 
Sanoma Corp. Large Cap 48 0 48 48 
Scanfil Oyj Mid Cap 5 16 21 24 
Sievi Capital Oyj Small Cap 0 0 0 0 
Siili Solutions Oyj Small Cap 8 9 17 26 
Solteq Oyj Small Cap 47 1 48 51 
Soprano Oyj Small Cap 0 0 0 0 
SRV Group Small Cap 0 1 1 1 
SSH Communications Security Oyj Small Cap 4 2 6 8 
Stockmann Plc A Small Cap 0 0 0 0 
Stockmann Plc B Small Cap 2 2 4 11 
Stora Enso Oyj A Large Cap 0 0 0 0 
Stora Enso Oyj B Large Cap 9 2 11 11 
Suominen Oyj Small Cap 5 0 5 5 
Taaleri Plc Mid Cap 3 3 6 7 
Talenom Oyj Mid Cap 1 14 15 29 
Tecnotree Corp. Small Cap 2 1 3 3 
Teleste Oyj Small Cap 3 3 6 6 
Telia Company Ab Large Cap 0 0 0 0 
Tieto Corp. Large Cap 0 0 0 0 
Tikkurila Oyj Mid Cap 0 0 0 0 
Trainers’ house Group Oyj Small Cap 0 0 0 0 
Tulikivi Oyj Small Cap 0 0 0 0 
UPM-Kymmene Corp. Large Cap 3 1 4 5 
Uponor Oyj Mid Cap 8 1 9 9 
Vaisala Oyj Mid Cap 1 6 7 7 
Valmet Oyj Large Cap 2 1 3 3 
Valoe Oyj Small Cap 0 2 2 2 
Viking line Abp Mid Cap 3 0 3 5 
Wulff Group Small Cap 6 1 7 13 
Wärtsilä Large Cap 13 0 13 46 
YIT Corp. Large Cap 4 0 4 6 
Yleiselektroniikka Oyj  Small Cap 5 1 6 6 
TOTAL   754 376 1130 1849 
 
